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Abstract 
Over the past decades a considerable amount of 
work has been devoted to the notion of autonomy 
and the intelligence of robots and of AI systems: 
depending on the application, several standards on 
the “levels of automation” have been proposed. 
Although current AI systems may have the intelli-
gence of a fridge, or of a toaster, some of such au-
tonomous systems have already challenged basic 
pillars of society and the law, e.g. whether lethal 
force should ever be permitted to be “fully auto-
mated.” The aim of this paper is to show that the 
normative challenges of AI entail different types of 
accountability that go hand-in-hand with choices of 
technological dependence, delegation of cognitive 
tasks, and trust. The stronger the social cohesion is, 
the higher the risks that can be socially accepted 
through the normative assessment of the not fully 
predictable consequences of tasks and decisions 
entrusted to AI systems and artificial agents. 
1 Introduction 
The paper offers a concise phenomenology on how automa-
tion and the development of artificial intelligence ("AI")- 
systems have affected pillars of the law. The purpose is 
threefold: in Section 3, focus is on the notion of autonomy 
as a source of misunderstanding in today's multidisciplinary 
debate. Section 4 sheds light on the normative challenges of 
technology and whether or not automation and AI may trig-
ger loopholes in the legal field. Section 5 draws the attention 
to different types of legal accountability that go hand-in-
hand with choices of technological dependence, delegation 
of cognitive tasks, and trust. The relation between law and 
technology should be grasped as the interaction between 
competing regulatory systems that not only may reinforce or 
contend against each other, but against further regulatory 
systems, such as the forces of the market and of social 
norms. Against this framework, the conclusion of the analy-
sis aims to elucidate the proper attitude with which we 
should address such a competition, together with the com-
promises that, at times, are necessary in the legal domain. 
2 A Legal Phenomenology 
Current debate on cognitive automata in the form of soft-
ware agents and AI systems can be traced back to the semi-
nal remarks of German scholars on automation and the law 
in the late 1800s. This co-evolution of technology and legal 
systems has known so far three major steps: they concern 
the ancestors of today's debate, the dawn of AI, and the 
turning point of the latter in the early 2000s. Each of these 
steps is examined separately in the following sections.  
2.1 Ancestors 
Scholars started examining the legal impact of automation, 
e.g. automatic vending machines, since the last decade of 
the 1800s. Think of Günther's Das Automatenrecht (1892), 
Schels' Der strafrechtliche Schutz des Automen (1897), 
Schiller's Rechtsverhältnisse des Automen and Ertel's Der 
Automatenmissbrauch und seine Charakterisierung als 
Delikt, both from 1898, up to Neumond's Der Automat in 
1899. From a civil––as opposed to the criminal––law view-
point, what initially was at stake concerned the role that the 
will of the parties to a contract could play with automation. 
From a criminal law perspective, the discussion revolved 
around whether and to what extent the process of automa-
tion could have produced a novel generation of loopholes in 
the criminal law field, forcing lawmakers to intervene. Con-
trary to the field of civil law, in which analogy often plays a 
crucial role so as to determine individual liability, individu-
als can be held criminally liable for their behaviour only on 
the basis of an explicit criminal norm. The principle is relat-
ed to a basic tenet of the rule of law, which is summarized, 
in continental Europe, with the formula of the principle of 
legality: "no crime, nor punishment without a criminal law."  
More than a century later, this kind of debate is still going 
on. Reflect on the EU data protection regulation n. 679 from 
2016, or "GDPR," according to which individuals have a 
right to explanation that derives from the notification duties 
of the data controllers, in order to provide the data subjects 
with all the information necessary to ensure fair and trans-
parent processing. On the one hand, pursuant to Articles 
13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g) of the GDPR, this information regards 
"the existence of automated decision-making, including pro-
filing, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in 
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those cases, meaningful information about the logic in-
volved, as well as the significance and the envisaged conse-
quences of such processing for the data subject." On the 
other hand, according to Article 22(1), "the data subject 
shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based 
solely on automated processing, including profiling, which 
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her." Leaving aside the tricky 
meaning of some formulas of this article––that refer either 
to general clauses, such as that which "significantly" may 
affect the data subject, or to vague notions on what "produc-
es legal effects"––it remains unclear how to interpret the 
levels of human involvement in the decision-making pro-
cess, e.g. how to interpret the formula of "a decision based 
solely on automated processing." Would the result of an au-
tomated processing that is not actively assessed by any hu-
man, but is formally attributed to them, fall beyond the 
scope of Article 22(1)?  
There is however a crucial difference between the legal 
debate on automation from the 1890s and current discus-
sions on automated processing. The technological leap con-
cerns the "logic involved" in such automated processing. 
The latter increasingly regards a particular class of algo-
rithms that either augment or replace analysis and decision-
making by humans, as occurs with the discipline of machine 
learning, i.e. algorithms capable to define or modify deci-
sion-making rules autonomously. The second step of our 
phenomenology has thus to do with the field of AI and more 
particularly, with the crucial shift from automation to artifi-
cial autonomy. 
2.2 The Dawn of AI 
There are two ways in which we can appreciate the impact 
of AI on current legal systems. The first way concerns the 
grandfather of current work on AI and the law––namely, the 
great German polymath Gottfried W. Leibniz––and his 
dream to make legal reasoning and enforcement automatic 
through the use of combinatorial analysis, probability calcu-
lus, and binary arithmetic [Pagallo, 2005 and 2016a]. From 
this stance, it follows that the law can be conceived of as a 
rich test bed and important application field for logic-based 
AI research that regards: (i) applications of logic to the rep-
resentation of legal regulations, where the legal conclusions 
follow from that representation as a matter of deduction; (ii) 
applications of logic to legal rules that are not just applied 
but are the object of reasoning and discourse; and, (iii) both 
interpretative reasoning in light of the facts of a case, and 
evidential reasoning to establish such facts (as in, say, ap-
plying statutory rules in unforeseen circumstances). On the 
basis of “formal models of legal procedure and of multi-
agent interaction in legal proceedings,” the overall idea is 
that the scope of logic is widening from deduction to infor-
mation flow, argumentation and interaction [Prakken and 
Sartor, 2015].  
 On the other hand, attention should be drawn to the origi-
nal plan of AI, namely, the design and setting of machines 
that mimic (also but not only) cognitive functions that hu-
mans associate with their own intelligence, such as learning 
and reasoning, planning and problem solving. Here, focus is 
on how AI systems and apps, such as smart software agents, 
AI robots, or other autonomous systems may affect the re-
quirements and functions of the law, i.e. what the law is 
supposed to be (requirements), and what it is called to do 
(functions). Admittedly, after the birth of AI in the 1950s 
and the grand expectations of both the founding fathers and 
leaders of this kind of research, we had to wait for more 
than Simon's "25 years," or Minski's "current generation," in 
order to shift from simple automation to robust autonomous 
systems [Simon, 1965; Minski, 1967]. Although we still 
have not got either machines that are capable of doing any 
work men can do, or the solution for the problem of creating 
proper artificial intelligence, we are increasingly dealing 
with systems that gain knowledge or skills from their own 
interaction with the living beings inhabiting the surrounding 
environment, so that more complex cognitive structures 
emerge in the state-transition system of the AI application. 
Rather than simple machines that can operate or control a 
process mechanically, in other words, we are progressively 
interacting with proper artificial agents.  
2.3 The Turning Point  
Over the past decade, the feasibility, importance, and scala-
bility of current AI technologies have gone hand-in-hand 
with the rapid progress of "four self-reinforcing trends," that 
concern the improvement of more sophisticated statistical 
and probabilistic methods, the increasing availability of 
large amount of data and of cheap, enormous computational 
power, up to the transformation of places and spaces into 
IT-friendly environments, e.g. smart cities and domotics 
[Cath et al., 2016]. What this huge transformation means 
from a legal point of view, can be summed up here with two 
crucial points.  
The first remark brings us back to Leibniz and more spe-
cifically, to G.W.F. Hegel's critique of his work. As stressed 
in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy (part III, C, 1), 
Hegel admired Leibniz's principles of "individuality" and of 
"indistinguishability," and yet he claimed, "this is an artifi-
cial system, which is founded on a category of understand-
ing, that of the absoluteness of abstract individuality" [He-
gel, ed. 1892-6]. In simpler terms, what Leibniz missed was 
the impact of his own ideas and projects on the real world, 
that is, how making legal reasoning automatic would have 
changed both requirements and functions of the law. Going 
back to current advancements in the field of AI, the same 
remark holds true. The more AI attains its own aim to create 
systems that function in smart ways, the less our world re-
mains unaffected, the more we have to pay attention to the 
trends and effects of this profound transformation. We re-
turn to this stance below in Section 4. 
 The second crucial point regards a popular topic of to-
day's debate as well as a major source of misunderstanding 
among scholars and policy makers, namely, the aforemen-
tioned shift from automation to the autonomy of AI systems. 
There are indeed three different ways in which we can grasp 
the notion of autonomy. The first meaning has to be distin-
guished from further notions of adaptability and interactivi-
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ty [Allen et al., 2000]. From this perspective, an AI system 
can be conceived of as an autonomous system when it modi-
fies its inner states or properties without external stimuli, 
thereby exerting control over its actions without any direct 
intervention of humans [Floridi and Sanders, 2004]. Such a 
property can of course complement both the interactivity 
and adaptability of the system. In the first case, the system 
perceives its environment and responds to stimuli by chang-
ing the values of its own properties or inner states. In the 
second case, an AI system is adaptable, when it can improve 
the rules through which its own properties or inner states 
change. Taken together, such criteria single out why we 
should refer to an AI system as an "agent," rather than a 
simple tool of human interaction. 
The second meaning of autonomy summarizes the previ-
ous properties of what constitutes the notion of agency with 
a single word. Consider the UK Ministry of Defense's Joint 
Doctrine Note on "unmanned aircraft systems" from March 
2011. The notion of autonomy there is connected to a sys-
tem "capable of understanding higher level intent and direc-
tion." Along these lines, there can be different levels of au-
tonomy, and of automation. For example, in the Federal Au-
tomated Vehicles Policy adopted by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation in September 2016, the latter distinguishes 
six levels based on who does what, and when, i.e. from level 
0 in which human drivers do everything to level 5 in which 
"the automated system can perform all driving tasks, under 
all conditions that a human driver could perform them."  
The final meaning of autonomy is the more controversial, 
since it likens AI autonomy to human autonomy, including 
at times "free will" and "moral agency" as used to describe 
human decision-making. Although this stance appears quite 
science fictional, we find it time and again in current debate, 
either for philosophical reasons, or for political motives, e.g. 
the "Campaign to Stop Killer Robots" launched in April 
2013 by both a prominent non-governmental organization, 
such as Human Rights Watch, and the Harvard International 
Human Rights Clinic. Leaving aside in this context the po-
litical understanding of this latter debate [Burri, 2016], let us 
examine the anthropomorphist meaning of AI autonomy 
separately in the next section. 
3 Are You Autonomous, Aren't You?  
A considerable amount of work has been devoted over the 
past years to studying the normative challenges of fully au-
tonomous AI systems and robots, that is, according to the 
third meaning of autonomy, as illustrated above in the pre-
vious section. Scholars have examined such scenarios as AI 
systems developing an interest in self-preservation, or harm-
ing humans so as to benefit themselves, or accessing quan-
tum computers capable of cracking the most sophisticated 
control code systems. In addition, scholars have discussed 
whether and to what extent AI systems should enjoy their 
own rights, such as the right to be free from pain and suffer-
ing, the right to free speech, and so forth. This is what, some 
years ago, I dubbed as the theses of the Front of Robotic 
Liberation [Pagallo, 2013]. 
Among the most committed advocates of a new genera-
tion of AI crimes and rights, suffice it to mention the work 
of Gabriel Hallevy. In his view, AI technology "has the ca-
pability of fulfilling the awareness requirements in criminal 
law" [Hallevy, 2015], together with "the mental element re-
quirements of both intent offenses and recklessness offens-
es." This not only means that AI systems can be either liable 
as direct perpetrators of criminal offenses, or responsible for 
crimes of negligence, or on strict liability basis, and so on. 
Moreover, the general defense of loss of self-control, insani-
ty, intoxication, or factual and legal mistakes, could protect 
such artificial agents. Once the mental element requirement 
is fulfilled in the case of a robot, there would be no reason 
why the general purposes of punishment and sentencing, i.e. 
retribution and deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation, 
down to capital penalty, should not be applied to AI ma-
chines. 
Although we may buy Lawrence Solum's argument that 
"one cannot, on conceptual grounds, rule out in advance the 
possibility that AIs should be given the rights of constitu-
tional personhood" [Solum, 1992]––or, for that matter, that 
the traditional paraphernalia of criminal lawyers could be 
properly extended to the regulation of AI systems––there 
are two problems with this kind of stance. On the one hand, 
if we admit there being AI machines capable of autonomous 
decisions similar in all relevant aspects to the ones humans 
make, the next step would be to acknowledge that the legal 
meaning of "person," along with that of crimes of intent, of 
negligence, of strict liability, etc., will radically change. 
Even Solum admits that, "given this change in form of life, 
our concept of a person may change in a way that creates a 
cleavage between human and person." Likewise, in [Hilde-
brandt et al., 2010], they warn that "the empirical finding 
that novel types of entities develop some kind of self-
consciousness and become capable of intentional actions 
seems reasonable, as long as we keep in mind that the emer-
gence of such entities will probably require us to rethink no-
tions of consciousness, self-consciousness and moral agen-
cy." At the end of the day, nobody knows to where this sce-
nario may lead. For instance, would a strong AI robotic 
lawyer accept Hallevy's argument that "evil is not part of the 
components of criminal liability" [Hallevy, 2015]? What if 
the AI agent, rather than an advocate of current exclusive 
legal positivism, is a follower of the natural law tradition? 
On the other hand, at the risk of being lambasted for reac-
tionary anthropocentrism, we should admit another kind of 
priority. Rather than debating Sci-Fi scenarios of artificial 
agents endowed with human-like properties, such as free 
will or moral sense, attention should be drawn to how the 
behaviour of some AI systems already falls within the loop-
holes of the law, provoking a new generation of hard cases 
that necessitate the intervention of lawmakers at both na-
tional and international levels. We do not have to wait, in 
other words, for any top level of automation, e.g. level 5 of 
the US Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, in order to ad-
mit that some current AI systems have already challenged 
basic pillars of society and the law. Lawyers must be prag-
matic, after all.  
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4 Accountable AI 
As mentioned above in Section 2.1, we should distinguish 
between criminal law and civil law, in order to appreciate 
the normative challenges of AI technology and their impact 
on current legal systems. Whereas, in the field of civil law, 
analogy can play a crucial role in order to define matters of 
accountability and personal responsibility, criminal liability 
can be established only on the basis of an explicit norm. 
Next sections illustrate this very difference through some 
examples in the field of criminal law (section 4.1), and of 
civil law (section 4.2). Then, Section 5 examines how legis-
lators and policy makers should address the normative chal-
lenges of AI. 
4.1 Criminal Accountability 
As the grandfather of legal automation and AI & law, Wil-
helm Leibniz, used to say, "every mind has a horizon in re-
spect to its present intellectual capacity but not in respect to 
its future intellectual capacity" (quoted by [Coudert 1995]). 
In light of Leibniz’s wisdom, I risk here a projection. The 
scenario is inspired by a true story: in May 2014, Vital, a 
robot developed by Aging Analytics UK, was appointed as a 
board member by the Japanese venture capital firm Deep 
Knowledge, in order to predict successful investments. As a 
press released was keen to inform us, Vital was chosen for 
its ability to pick up on market trends "not immediately ob-
vious to humans," regarding decisions on therapies for age-
related diseases. Drawing on the predictions of the AI ma-
chines, such trends of humans delegating crucial cognitive 
tasks to autonomous artificial agents will reasonably multi-
ply in the foreseeable future. But, how about the wrong 
evaluation of a robot that leads to a lack of capital increase 
and hence, to the fraudulent bankruptcy of the corporation?  
In this latter case, the alternative seems between "crimes 
of negligence" and the hypothesis of AI corporate liability. 
As to the crimes of negligence, liability depends on lack of 
due care, so that a reasonable person fails to guard others 
against foreseeable harms. This type of liability hinges on 
the traditional "natural-probable-consequence" liability 
model in criminal law that comprises two different types of 
responsibility. On the one hand, imagine either program-
mers, or manufacturers, or users who intend to commit a 
crime through their AI system, but the latter deviates from 
the plan and commits some other offence. On the other 
hand, think about humans having no intent to commit a 
wrong but who were negligent while designing, constructing 
or using an AI application. Although this second type of lia-
bility is trickier, most legal systems hold humans responsi-
ble even when they did not aim to commit any offense. In 
the view of traditional legal theory, the alleged novelty of all 
these cases resembles the responsibility of an owner or 
keeper of an animal "that is either known or presumed to be 
dangerous to mankind" [Davis, 2011]. 
Yet, as to the traditional crime of negligence, there is a 
problem: in the case of the wrong evaluation of the AI sys-
tem that eventually leads to the fraudulent bankruptcy of the 
corporation, humans could be held responsible only for the 
crime of bankruptcy triggered by the AI system’s evalua-
tion, since the mental element requirement of fraud would 
be missing in the case of the human members of the board. 
Therefore, the criminal liability of the corporation and even-
tually, that of the AI agent would be the only way to charge 
someone with the crime of fraudulent bankruptcy. This sce-
nario however means that most legal systems should amend 
themselves, in order to prosecute either the robot as the 
criminal agent of the corporation, or the corporation as such.  
4.2 Civil Accountability 
The current traditional interpretation of AI systems' behav-
iors in the field of civil law conceives such systems as sim-
ple tools of social interaction. Whereas, in criminal law, the 
accountability for bad AI behavior is typically imposed on 
individuals who voluntarily commit a wrong prohibited by 
law, in the field of civil law we should further distinguish 
between contracts and torts. In contracts, civil accountability 
mostly regards compensation to those affected by the harm-
ful behavior of a counterparty through the AI system; in tort 
law, payment follows from obligations between private per-
sons usually imposed by the state to compensate for damage 
provoked by AI wrongdoing. In both cases, there are some 
problems.  
In tort law, consider the European Directive 85/374/EEC 
on liability for defective products. Although national legis-
lation implementing the directive may include data and in-
formation in the notion of product, it remains far from clear 
whether and to what extent the adaptive and dynamic nature 
of AI through machine learning techniques, updates, or revi-
sions, may entail or create a defect in the "product." In addi-
tion, we should take into account the scenario of AI systems 
that functioned adequately but produced a harmful outcome 
on the basis of erroneous data, or bad inputs. Again, it is far 
from clear who should be held accountable, i.e. either the 
producer or manufacturer of the AI system, or the supplier 
of the data, such as the internet operator that failed provid-
ing connectivity, or both. However, data suppliers cannot be 
considered so far as "producers" in the sense of the Europe-
an directive; and moreover, the ecosystem behind an AI be-
havior can be so complex that may severely affect the abil-
ity of lawyers to sever the chain of liability through notions 
of legal causation and fault [Karnow, 1996]. No surprise 
then, that the EU Commission started the process for the 
amendment of the aforementioned directive in September 
2016. 
As to the field of contracts, the AI-as-tools approach 
means that rights and obligations established by the artificial 
agent (AA) directly bind the human principal (P), since all 
the acts of AA are considered as acts of P. In addition, P 
cannot evade liability by claiming either she did not intend 
to conclude such a contract or AA made a decisive mistake. 
In this latter case, e.g. in case of the erratic behaviour of 
AA, what P can do is to claim damages against the designer 
and producer of AA. According to the mechanism of the 
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burden of proof, P will have to demonstrate that AA was 
defective and that such defect existed while AA was under 
the manufacturer's control; and furthermore, the defect was 
the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by P. Still, it is 
difficult to accept that rights and obligations established by 
AAs would be directly conferred upon humans, because the 
principal wanted the specific content, or agreement, of the 
contract made by AA. Rather, rights and obligations are 
conferred onto humans because they delegate to AA the au-
thority to act on their behalf. Whereas the traditional ap-
proach ends up in a Hegelian night where all kinds of re-
sponsibility look grey, it thus seems necessary to amend to-
day's rules of the law, so that operators and users of robots 
should be held accountable in accordance with the different 
errors of the machine and the circumstances of the case. For 
example, humans should not be able to avoid the usual con-
sequence of robots making a decisive mistake, i.e. the an-
nulment of a contract, when the counterparty had to have 
been aware of a mistake that due to the erratic behavior of 
the robot, clearly concerned key elements of the agreement, 
such as the market price of the item or the substance of the 
subject-matter of that contract. In general terms, the aim 
should be to strike a balance between individuals claiming 
that they should not be ruined by the decisions or behaviour 
of their AAs and the counterparties of such machines, de-
manding the ability to safely interact with them. This is the 
balance that has been aimed at by several scholars [Allen 
and Widdison, 1996; Weitzenboeck, 2001; Barfield, 2005; 
Sartor, 2009; Pagallo, 2013; etc.). 
However, this latter approach faces a major problem, that 
is, the lack of data that depends either on current default 
rules of legal responsibility, or on the impossibility to test 
the AI systems in unstructured environments. Since such 
problems have to be examined vis-à-vis the different ways 
in which legislators aim to govern the field of technological 
research and development, these issues are deepened sepa-
rately in the next section.  
5 The Challenges of Regulation 
The previous sections have illustrated some cases brought 
on by AI technologies that, sooner or later, will induce na-
tional and international legislators to intervene in the fields 
of criminal and civil law. All in all, legislators are confront-
ed with three different kinds of challenge. They concern (i) 
the specific features of AI technology; (ii) the competition 
between regulatory systems; and, (iii) how to address such 
challenges at a meta-regulatory level. 
As to the AI features, from a legal viewpoint, the most sa-
lient aspect of this technology has to do with the unpredict-
able behavior of AI systems that may hinge on machine 
learning techniques, or on the complexity of the ecosystem 
behind them, etc. Legislators have so far tackled this scenar-
io through methods of accident control that either cut back 
on the scale of the activity via, e.g., strict liability rules, or 
aim to prevent such activities through the precautionary 
principle. Current default norms of legal responsibility can 
entail however a vicious circle, since the more the strict lia-
bility rules are effective, the less we can test our AI systems, 
the more such rules may hinder research and development in 
the field [Pagallo, 2016b]. The recent wave of extremely 
detailed regulations on the use of drones by the Italian Civil 
Aviation Authority, i.e. “ENAC,” illustrates this deadlock. 
As a result, we often lack enough data on the probability of 
events, their consequences and costs, to determine the levels 
of risk and, thus, the amount of insurance premiums and fur-
ther mechanisms, on which new forms of accountability for 
the behaviour of such machines may hinge. 
Yet, to make things even more intricate, we have to pay 
attention to the competition between regulatory systems, 
such as the forces of the market, or of social norms. Every 
regulatory system claims to govern social behaviour by its 
own means, and can even render the claim of another regu-
latory system inadequate, or superfluous. Reflect on all the 
cases in which the legal intent to regulate the process of 
technological innovation has failed, e.g. the EU e-money 
directive 46 from 2000. Soon after its implementation, fur-
ther forms of online payments, such as PayPal, forced the 
Bruxelles legislators to intervene, amending themselves 
with the new directive 110 from 2009. Regardless of the 
scenario we consider, however, such a competition between 
regulatory systems does not take place in a normative vacu-
um, but is structured by the presence of values and princi-
ples [Pagallo and Durante, 2016]. In addition to the techno-
logical and legal standards of the field, focus should thus be 
on the epistemic standards, i.e. ways to understand the in-
formational reality of AI systems, and both the social stand-
ards that enable users to trust such AI systems and evaluate 
the quality of the skills regardless of whether or not these 
skills meet social needs. Accordingly, policy makers and 
legislators should keep in mind the degree of social accepta-
bility and cohesion that affect their own decisions, that is, 
whether or not a shared set of values and principles exist. 
This bifurcation is critical, because it tells us something new 
about the normative challenges of AI from a meta-
regulatory point of view. There is a fundamental choice that 
has to be taken, regarding the delegation of decisions to au-
tonomous AI systems. The political resolution does not only 
depend on the degree of predictability and reliability of the 
AI decisions. Rather, the issue may revolve around the de-
gree of social agreement, or disagreement, that characterize 
the normative context under examination. How, then, should 
lawmakers address the interaction between competitive reg-
ulatory systems? How can we prevent legislations that may 
hinder the research in AI? How should we deal with the pe-
culiar unpredictability and risky behavior of some AI sys-
tems? How should we legally regulate the future?  
Luckily enough, there are multiple legal techniques with 
which we can properly address this set of challenges. Suf-
fice it to mention here three of them. First, focus should be 
on Justice Brandeis’s doctrine of experimental federalism, 
as espoused in New State Ice Co. v Leibmann (285 US 262 
(1932)). The idea is to flesh out the content of the rules that 
Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-17)
21
shall govern individual behavior through a beneficial com-
petition among legal systems. This is what occurs nowadays 
in the field of self-driving cars in the US, where seven states 
have enacted their own laws for this kind of technology. At 
its best possible light, the same policy will be at work with 
the EU regulation in the field of data protection [Pagallo, 
2017b]. 
Second, attention should be drawn to the principle of im-
plementation neutrality, according to which regulations are 
by definition specific to that technology and yet do not favor 
one or more of its possible implementations. The Federal 
Automated Vehicles Policy of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation––which was mentioned above in Section 
2.3––illustrates this legal technique. Although regulations 
are by definition specific to that technology, e.g. autono-
mous vehicles, there is no favoritism for one or more of its 
possible implementations. Even when the law sets up a par-
ticular attribute of that technology, lawmakers can draft the 
legal requirement in such a way that non-compliant imple-
mentations can be modified to become compliant. 
Third, legislators can adopt forms of legal experimenta-
tion. For example, over the past 14 years, the Japanese gov-
ernment has worked out a way to address the normative 
challenges of robotics through the creation of special zones 
for their empirical testing and development, namely, a form 
of living lab, or Tokku [Weng et al, 2015]. Likewise, in the 
field of autonomous vehicles, several EU countries have en-
dorsed this kind of approach: Sweden has sponsored the 
world’s first large-scale autonomous driving pilot project, in 
which self-driving cars use public roads in everyday driving 
conditions; Germany has allowed a number of tests with 
various levels of automation on highways, e.g. Audi's tests 
with an autonomously driving car on highway A9 between 
Ingolstadt and Nuremberg. In general terms, these forms of 
experimentation through lawfully de-regulated special zones 
represent the legal basis on which to collect empirical data 
and sufficient knowledge to make rational decisions for a 
number of critical issues. We can improve our understand-
ing of how AI systems may react in various contexts and 
satisfy human needs. We can better appreciate risks and 
threats brought on by possible losses of control of AI sys-
tems, so as to keep them in check. We can further develop 
theoretical frameworks that allow us to better appreciate the 
space of potential systems that avoid undesirable behaviors. 
In addition, we can rationally address the legal aspects of 
this experimentation, covering many potential issues raised 
by the next-generation AI systems and managing such re-
quirements, which often represent a formidable obstacle for 
this kind of research, as public authorizations for security 
reasons, formal consent for the processing and use of per-
sonal data, mechanisms of distributing risks through insur-
ance models and authentication systems, and more. 
Of course, some of these legal techniques can interact and 
reinforce each other [Pagallo, 2017c]. More importantly, 
they represent a mechanism of legal flexibility that allows 
us to address the interaction between regulatory systems 
wisely. At the end of the day, it seems fair to affirm that the 
aim of the law to govern the process of technological inno-
vation should neither hinder it, nor require over-frequent 
revision to manage such progress [Pagallo, 2016c].  
6 Conclusions 
The paper has offered a concise phenomenology on automa-
tion, autonomous AI systems, and the law, in order to de-
termine to what extent this field of technological innovation 
has already affected today's legal systems. By discarding 
Sci-Fi scenarios in Section 3, Section 4 dwelt on three ways 
in which the behavior of some AI systems falls within the 
loopholes of the law. Correspondingly, legislators have to 
tackle three different kinds of challenge that were examined 
in Section 5. They concern the specific features of AI tech-
nology, the interaction between competitive regulatory sys-
tems, and how lawmakers can address such challenges at a 
meta-regulatory level. Some legal techniques, such as the 
rules of experimental federalism or the implementation neu-
trality-approach, can offer mechanisms of legal flexibility 
that allow us to properly address such challenges.  
All in all, there is a fundamental choice that has to be tak-
en, regarding the growing delegation of decisions to auton-
omous AI systems and a myriad of smart artificial agents. 
The political resolution does not only depend on the degree 
of predictability and reliability of the AI decisions. The is-
sue may revolve around the degree of social agreement, or 
disagreement, that characterize the normative context under 
examination. Tasks entrusted to AI systems, autonomous 
robots, or software agents, affect assets and interests that 
does not only affect the degree of "social acceptability" that 
concerns the risk inherent in the delegation process. The 
technical and legal decisions on how tasks delegated to AI 
systems may impact on assets and human interests, can also 
regard values and principles that ground those assets and 
interests.  
Matters of technological dependence and the correspond-
ing grade of delegation and autonomy have thus to be com-
prehended in accordance with the degree of social cohesion 
that exists in the normative context in which the conse-
quences of tasks and decisions delegated to AI systems are 
evaluated. The definition of legal standards, as a means that 
allows agents to communicate and interact, has to take into 
account the interplay with further regulatory systems and 
the extent to which social cohesion is affected by technolo-
gy, e.g. unemployment triggered by robotics [Floridi, 2017]. 
The stronger the social cohesion is, the higher a risk in the 
delegation process that can be socially accepted through the 
normative assessment of not fully predictable consequences 
of entrusted tasks and decisions to AI systems and autono-
mous artificial agents. Since AI systems are here to stay, the 
aim of the law should be to wisely govern our mutual rela-
tionships. The mechanisms of legal flexibility illustrated in 
this paper show how this can be possible. 
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